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Abstract  
The NASA Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) 
micrometeoroid and orbital debris protection 
ability has recently been assessed against an 
updated, higher threat space environment 
model.  The new environment was analyzed in 
conjunction with a revised EMU solid model 
using a NASA computer code.  Results showed 
that the EMU exceeds the required 
mathematical Probability of having No 
Penetrations (PNP) of any suit pressure bladder 
over the remaining life of the program (2,700 
projected hours of 2 person spacewalks).  The 
success probability was calculated to be 0.94, 
versus a requirement of >0.91, for the current 
spacesuit’s outer protective garment.   
In parallel to the probability assessment, 
potential improvements to the current 
spacesuit’s outer protective garment were built 
and impact tested.  A NASA light gas gun was 
used to launch projectiles at test items, at 
speeds of approximately 7 km per second.  Test 
results showed that substantial garment 
improvements could be made, with mild material 
enhancements and moderate assembly development.  The spacesuit’s PNP would improve 
marginally with the tested enhancements, if they were available for immediate incorporation.  
Figure 1 – NASA’s EMU at work on flight STS-116, late 2006
This paper discusses the results of the model assessment process and test program. These 
findings add confidence to the continued use of the existing NASA EMU during International 
Space Station (ISS) assembly and Shuttle Operations.  They provide a viable avenue for 
improved hypervelocity impact protection for the EMU, or for future space suits. 
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Introduction 
In May of 2002, NASA completed an update to the model of Low Earth Orbit (LEO) 
Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris (MMOD) and utilized it to re-assess the risk posed during the 
planned undertaking of ISS construction and maintenance EVAs.[1]   This review concluded that 
the maximum acceptable EVA risk was exceeded for International Space Station operations over 
the life of the program.  The new PNP was calculated at 0.88 versus a program requirement of 
>0.91.  Release of these findings sent a shock wave through the EVA community that sped them 
on a path to understand the decrease and to scrub the detail of the 3 dimensional model 
describing the EMU and the computer code (called BUMPER) that calculates the hypervelocity 
impact exposure risk for the EMU.   
Due to the level of concern for crewmember safety during the spacewalk intensive station 
program, potential improvements to the EMU softgoods were developed and exercised in parallel 
to the full analytical scrub. 
NASA and its contractors expected this dual approach to ultimately validate the EMU’s ability to 
meet MMOD safety levels in the space station environment, whether or not the initial PNP 
assessment proved accurate.        
Background 
The NASA Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) is comprised of the Space Suit Assembly (SSA) 
and the Life Support System (LSS) that astronauts wear when performing space walks (called 
Extravehicular Activities, or EVAs) from the Shuttle, or from the International Space Station (ISS), 
see Figure 1.  The EMU must protect the crewmember from the harsh external space 
environment, while supplying a habitable internal environment.  Besides the vacuum and the 
thermal challenges of space, the EMU must protect crewmembers from the micrometeoroids and 
orbital debris known to traverse low Earth orbits.  During ISS and Shuttle EVAs, these projectiles 
will have average intercept speeds of between 10 and 20 km per second.  They range in size 
from miniscule dust particles to large, radar trackable fragments. 
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The Orbital Debris Environments Model (ORDEM) was developed by NASA and has been used 
in various iterations for over a decade.  This model maps the fluxes of micrometeoroids and 
orbital debris of various sizes, versus orbital altitude and inclination.    As of 2002, NASA’s EMU 
was certified to meet its Probability of No Penetration (PNP) requirments baselined on the 
ORDEM 96 micrometeoroid and orbital debris model.   See Figure 2 for a comparison of ORDEM 
2000 and ORDEM 96).  Of note is the significant increase in flux density in the 0.05 cm, critical 
penetration size for the EMU TMG.  By definition, a critical penetration is one that will cause a 
pressure leak in the EMU. 
ORDEM 2000 and ORDEM 96 Results Comparison 
400Km Circular Orbit, 51.6 Degree Inclination, 2002
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Figure 2 – Comparison of NASA Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris Flux Models 
The new model shows a significant drop in particles above the 0.5 cm size range.  The flux 
density of this MMOD region is roughly 3 orders of magnitude less than for particles at the critical 
diameter for the EMU TMG though, making the decrease insignificant to the EMU’s safety  The 
“base data size ranges” shown by down arrows were points of direct comparison for both models. 
During the late 1990’s through the early 2000’s, the space community was devoting significant 
resources to understanding and cataloguing the low earth orbit MMOD environment.  The 
ORDEM 96 model relied on data from the Long Duration Exposure Facility (LDEF), the Space 
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Surveilance Network (SSN) catalog and the HAYSTACK radar.  ORDEM 2000 was able to add 
new empirical information from: 
• the Russian MIR space station 
• EURECA (a Shuttle deployed European sattelite) 
• SFU (a Japanese Space Flyer Unit, launched on an H-2 rocket and retrieved by the 
Shuttle on STS-72), 
• the Hubble Space Telescope 
• Goldstone (Pasadena, CA) and HAX (Cambridge, MA) radars 
• the Shuttle (review of thermal tile and window damage) 
 
Additionally, NASA’s ORDEM 2000 incorporated more accurate mathematical models due to 
advances in computing ability.  Based on a rigorous international peer review, ORDEM 2000 
became the standard model for low Earth orbit debris and micrometeoroid flux predictions. 
Discussion
A graphic representing the overall program of revising the PNP calculation for the EMU is shown 
in Figure 3, PNP Assessment Methodology.  Genesis of the ORDEM 2000 model has been 
discussed as Background.   A summary of the rest of the approach to PNP recalculation follows. 
 EMU Size and Configuration
Per the assessment plan, the EMU three-dimensional model (using I-deas® software) was 
reviewed to assure that it was fully consistent with the current flight configuration.  The review 
revealed that the model had 8” longer legs than the 95th percentile male would have in the suit.  
Since the 95th percentile American male is the largest crew  design point, this geometric 
deficiency was corrected.  The following additional model improvements were considered: 
• update the glove configuration to the Phase VI glove – a more dextrous glove 
• add Cuff Checklist Band and checklist pages – spacewalk to do list 
• add Wrist Mirror Band and Mirror – to see control settings 
• add EVA Remote Camera Assembly (ERCA) – helmet cam 
• add the Helmet Mounted Lights – work lights for night passes 
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• add the Mini Work Station (MWS) Base plate and Gimbal – a tool belt for spacewalks 
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Figure 3 – Spacesuit Probability of No Penetration Assessment Methodology and Responsibilities 
 
Of these changes, some (the Cuff Checklist Band and Pages, Wrist Mirror Band and Mirror, the 
remote camera, and work station and baseplate) would have little or no positive effect on the 
EMU’s overall shielding and would further complicate an already detailed model.  Their 
incorporation could risk model integrity and increase its run time.  Thus, they were not included in 
the BUMPER II model, though their I-deas®  surface models were developed.   
 
The Helmet Lights and the Phase VI Gloves were included in the latest BUMPER model as each of them 
had an effect on impact vulnerability.  The Helmet Lights marginally improve upper EMU shielding and were 
updated to the latest configuration, which has a somewhat larger geometry than older lights.  The Phase VI 
Glove’s revised quick disconnect location, higher up the arm, and broad design differences from the 
previous, 4000 Series Gloves, end up decreasing shielding slightly.  This is due to the Phase VI Gloves’ 
design being heavily focused on mobility. 
Ultimately, the overall EMU I-deas® model contained well over 10,000 elements spread across 41 different 
material regions of the EMU, see Figure 4 – Final I-deas®  Surface Mesh for EMU. 
 5
EVA Time and Locations 
NASA’s Mission Operations Directorate (MOD) is responsible for EVA planning and 
choreography.  It is difficult for them to 
characterize the precise amount of spacewalk 
time that is associated with each valid work 
location over the course of the EMU’s full 2,700-
hour operational time period on the ISS.  The 
2,700 hour operational time is the result of 1,350 
estimated EVA hours for each of two 
crewmembers.  Final EVA choreography is 
worked out only a short time prior to each 
Shuttle mission, based on a detailed review of 
astronaut EVA simulations conducted 
underwater at the Neutral Buoyancy Lab (NBL), 
and in the virtual reality and air bearing floor 
labs at Johnson Space Center (JSC).  What 
NASA could model, years in advance of most 
EVAs, were 156 combinations of planned EMU spacewalk orientations and locations on the ISS, 
through full build and operation.  Orbiter docked and undocked conditions were included as 
follows:   740 Shuttle docked hours used, with the space station in a +XVV orientation and 1,960 
hours used with the ISS in a -XVV orientation (see Figure 5, noting that +XVV places the +X axis 
of the station in the direction of travel).  An even time split over the 132 locations/combinations 
was used as the best estimate, with both ISS and Shuttle vehicle shadowing of work sites 
incorporated in the model as appropriate.  For conservatism, the EMU probability of no 
penetration had traditionally been reported without shadowing. 
Figure 4 – Final I-deas®
Surface Mesh for EMU 
Suit Material Parameters  
Accurate EMU material properties and lay-up geometry for the TMG and for metallic, fiberglass 
and polycarbonate components are critical to an accurate PNP calculation.  These properties are 
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well known and were validated in the BUMPER II code prior to this series of runs (see Figure 6 -  
EMU Component Breakdown).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Velocity
Earth
Velocity
Earth
+XVV -XVV 
Figure 5 – ISS Orientations – Shuttle docks in +XVV and then moves to –XVV for improved vehicle 
shielding.  Note – the EMU is used for EVAs from the ISS both with and without the Shuttle docked. 
 
 
Figure 6 – Breakdown of EMU Hardgoods and Softgoods – TMG Is Removed, Except from Display and 
Controls Module & Hard Upper Torso  
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TMG Improvements
In parallel to the scrubbing of the EMU model and it’s impact safety calculations, revised Thermal 
and Micrometeoroid Garment (TMG) constructions were developed, built and tested.  Since a 
number of “ballistic” materials have been developed since the TMG lay-up was last modified, 
there were a number of candidates available to test for improvement to the TMG’s ballistic limit.   
The TMG is the outer, multilayered fabric that covers the majority of the EMU.  In areas where it 
is backed up by hardgoods it is primarily present for spacesuit thermal control.  However, in 
zones of softgoods only, it forms the primary protective barrier to micrometeoroid and orbital 
debris penetration.   
The TMG has a fairly consistent lay-up on the EMU.  In the Arms and Lower Torso, TMG and 
Restraint layers are as shown in Figures 7 & 8 – Baseline Lay-up and TMG Layers.  The white 
outer layer that is most visible to the observer is a Teflon impregnated Orthofabric.   
0.125”
0.06”
Baseline Layup
Orthofabric - 0.021”
Liner - 0.0083”
Bladder - 0.0124”
 
Figure 7 – Baseline EMU TMG and Restraint Lay-ups and Thicknesses – 0.125” gap is typical, due to fabric 
fit geometry and bunching   
 
It’s rugged, durable and damage resistant.  Under that are 5 layers of aluminized mylar, 
separated by a non-woven scrim (together called MLI or Multi-Layer Insulation).  These layers 
form a high performance thermal insulation for the EMU when evacuated.  Below the MLI is the 
liner layer which is comprised of Neoprene coated nylon ripstop.  It’s a slip layer, designed to 
minimize abrasion with the pressurized restraint layer below it.  These layers constitute the TMG.   
On average, there is about an eighth inch gap between the TMG liner and the restraint layers, 
though no physical attempt is made to maintain this gap.  The Restraint layer, made of dacron is  
MLI - 0.0196” 
Restraint - 0.0116” 
TMG
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 Figure 8 – Thermal and Micrometeoroid Garment Layers  
next.  This layer bears the primary hoop stress loads from the pressurized suit.  Lastly, we have 
the Bladder layer.  This is the pressure sealing layer of the EMU arms and lower torso.  It’s made 
from urethane/nylon laminate.   
The TMG/Restraint system defines a Whipple shield arrangement for the crewmember’s Arms, 
Lower Torso and Legs.  The outer Orthofabric induces the majority of the shock pulse that will 
break up an impinging particle and cause formation of an expanding plasma jet.  The MLI and 
Liner layers aid particle break up and add some spacing, allowing the plasma jet to begin to 
spread radially.  Lastly, the plasma jet traverses the Liner/Restraint gap and impinges on the 
Restraint and Bladder layers.  Any particle impact that caused debris to be visible on a plexiglass 
witness plate under the Bladder, or caused the Bladder layer to fail a 2 psi leakage test 
constituted a “Failed” test.  
On other areas of the EMU where the TMG is backed up by hardgoods, the ballistic limits are 
substantially higher, so lay-ups including hard goods were not tested.  The EMU Phase VI 
Gloves, however, have a reduced TMG to maintain high mobility.  As critical as mobility is to the 
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mission and noting the relatively small area of the gloves, the glove TMG was not examined for 
improvement at this time.   
 
Highlights of this test effort include:  a) completion of two rounds of hypervelocity impact testing 
with down selection of the best candidates for mobility areas, b) concept iteration and 
manufacturing of three mock-up leg TMGs for test and c) functional performance testing of the 
TMG mock-ups built into legs.  A performance comparison of the mock-ups to the current flight 
Leg TMG was also completed. 
 
The initial round of hypervelocity testing was reported on in JSC 6307711.  During this round of 
tests, conducted in mid to late 2004, 51 test lay-ups were impacted at the White Sands Test 
Facility (WSTF) using a 17 caliber, 2 stage light gas gun.   
 
In support of the second round of hypervelocity impact testing, carried out in May and June of 
2005, ILC and JSC’s Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility (HITF) produced 90 test articles for 
evaluation.  This testing was completed at White Sands and is reported on in JSC 6309312.  
Various lay-up configurations, impact angles, projectile sizes and velocities were evaluated. 
Results 
Probability of No Penetration Recalculation 
NASA’s BUMPER II computer code brings together the following elements to calculate EMU 
exposures at different sites and integrates those inputs to arrive at a Probability of No Penetration 
over 2,700 operational hours of two crewmember ISS spacewalk time: 
• information from the NASA ORDEM environments model for the space station orbit, 
• I-deas®  software based geometric data from the EMU and the space station,  and 
• EMU area lay-up ballistic limits, based on impact tests  
Figure 9 shows a sample graphical representation of the I-deas®  based geometric attitude 
information for a specific planned EVA. 
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Figure 9 – BUMPER II 3 Dimensional Model of ISS with Docked Shuttle, Showing EVA Crew Attitudes and 
Locations 
A substantial effort was required on the part of the NASA environments team to calculate the 
various PNP cases.  A total of 3,744 runs were made, with each run consisting of exercising the  
BUMPER II code several times.  To make the 3,744 runs, BUMPER II was invoked 7,512 times 
and required the use of 266 finite element  models.   Results of the case runs follow: 
• EMU without Shuttle and ISS shadowing; PNP = 94.1% (see Figure 10) 
• EMU with Shuttle and ISS shadowing; PNP = 97.1% 
• EMU with enhanced protective garment and invoking Shuttle and ISS shadowing; 
PNP = 98.1% (see Figure 11) 
 
These PNPs can be compared to the requirement of 91% PNP over 2,700 hours of 2 person 
EVA6.   Whether considering Shuttle and space station shadowing or not, the safety requirement 
is met.  A selectively enhanced TMG improves PNP by a seemingly small 1%.  However, if those 
enhancements were available for immediate incorporation, they would reduce the chances of a 
penetration from 1 in 35 (97.1%), to 1 in 52 (98.1%), a substantial improvement in safety . 
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 SX/Hypervelocity Impact Tec hno logy  Grou p
E. Christiansen, 281-483-5311 4
NASA Johns on Space  Center
MMOD Risk Assessments for EVA
Baseline Results (no Enhancement)
Baseline MMOD risk f or 2700 EVA-hours without ISS and Shuttle shadowing 
based on BUMPER-II results
Layup Key:
Baseline
Option 1 (thin)
Option 2 (medium)
PNP: 0.938 Risk: 6.2% Odds: 1 in 1641  isk: 5.9   O ds: 1 in 17
Figure 10 – Recalculated Probability of No Penetration, Including ISS and Shuttle Shadowing and Baseline 
TMG 
 
SX/Hypervelocity Impact Tec hno logy  Grou p
E. Christiansen, 281-483-5311 5
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MMOD risk decreases by f actor of 2 to 3 f or an enhanced EMU FEM based on BUMPER-II results
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Baseline
PNP: 0.978 Risk: 2.2% Odds: 1 in 4581  isk: 1.9   O ds: 1 in 2
Figure 11 – Recalculated Probability of No Penetration, Including Enhanced TMG Locations and ISS and 
Shuttle Shadowing 
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Round 1 of Lay-up Impact Testing [11] 
This round of impact testing confirmed the failure parameters for several candidate TMG 
materials and lay-up configurations using aluminum spherical projectiles in the 0.5 to 1.5mm 
diameter range.  Impact velocity was approximately 6.8 km/s for this test phase.  Velocity vectors 
normal to the test sample plane (0º) and at 45º to the sample plane were tested. 
 
To validate the test set-up and equipment used, a set of baseline TMG impact tests were 
conducted.  These were followed by absorber layer tests, substituting cloths made from Spectra 
1000, silicone coated Kevlar, silicone coated Nextel, silicone coated Vectran, Neoprene coated 
Nylon and some of these fabrics without silicone coating.  After the Absorber tests, a series of 
spacer tests were performed using Primaloft (a continuous filament Polyester insulation) and a 
urethane Open Cell Foam (OCF) as spacer layers.  Table 1 shows the results of this testing.  Any 
impact that just penetrated the pressure bladder, either visually or verified by post-test leak check 
was considered “at the ballistic limit” for the layup. 
 
Finally, a number of tests were conducted with promising combinations of absorber and spacer 
materials.  The end result of this testing is that no candidate absorber layer exceeded the 
capability of Neoprene Coated Nylon (NCN), already used for the Liner layer.  Thus, neoprene 
coated nylon became the absorber of choice. 
 
Open Cell Foam (OCF) was selected as the best spacer material.  The OCF tended to disperse 
the plasma jet energy over a wider area than the the Primaloft Spacer.  Additionally, a breakdown 
of the Primaloft can be expected within the temperature range of planned hot spacewalks.  This 
breakdown would cause the Primaloft to lose it’s loft over time, decreasing impact resistance.   
Various lay-ups using these materials were evaluated in Round 2 as an optimization exercise. 
 
Round 2 of Lay-up Impact Testing [12] 
The results of the Round 2 testing showed that creating additional standoff (gap) between the 
Orthofabric on the outside of the TMG and the inner layers was a valid avenue to ballistic limit 
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Test Config. New Layer Angle Impact Velocity
Al Projectile Dia. 
(mm) Pass/Fail Notes
Baseline 0 6.97 0.5 Pass
Baseline 0 6.71 0.6 Pass @ Ballistic Limit
Baseline 0 6.76 1.25 Fail
Baseline 45 6.78 0.7 Fail
Baseline 45 6.72 0.8 Fail
Spacer 1 0 6.95 0.8 Pass
Spacer 1 0 7.26 1 Fail
Spacer 1 0 6.68 1.2 Fail
Spacer 1 45 6.63 1 Pass
Spacer 1 45 6.76 1.2 Pass
Spacer 3 0 6.44 1 Pass
Spacer 3 0 7.12 1 Pass
Spacer 3 0 6.79 1.2 Fail BL
Spacer 3 45 6.65 1.2 Fail BL
Spacer 3 45 6.75 1.5 Fail
Absorber 1 0 6.82 1.25 Fail BL
Absorber 1 0 6.75 1.5 Fail
Absorber 1 45 6.68 1.3 Pass
Absorber 1 45 6.86 1.3 Pass BL
Absorber 2 0 6.72 1.25 Fail BL
Absorber 2 0 6.7 1.5 Fail
Absorber 2 45 6.66 1.3 Fail
Absorber 3 0 6.67 1.25 Fail
Absorber 3 0 6.61 1.42 Fail
Absorber 3 0 6.65 1.5 Fail
Absorber 3 45 6.76 1.3 Pass
Absorber 4 0 6.85 1.25 Pass
Absorber 4 0 6.72 1.3 Fail BL
Absorber 4 0 6.65 1.5 Fail
Absorber 4 45 6.75 1.3 Pass
Absorber 5 0 6.75 1.25 Fail BL
Absorber 5 0 6.7 1.42 Fail
Absorber 5 0 6.81 1.5 Fail
Absorber 5 45 6.8 1.3 Fail
2 layers of 
Coated Nextel 
surrounding OCF
2 layers of 
Coated Nylon 
surrounding OCF
2 layers of 
Primaloft in 
between MLI and 
NCN
2 layers of Open 
Cell Foam in 
between MLI and 
NCN
2 layers of 
Coated Vectran 
surrounding OCF
2 layers of 
Sprectra 
surrounding OCF
Test Results WITH Spacer
Ballistic Limit Test Results
2 layers of 
Coated Kevlar 
surrounding OCF
Table 1 – Round 1 of Spacesuit Protective Garment Layup Impact Test Results [11] 
 
improvements.  Results showed that sandwiching the open cell foam layer between two neoprene 
coated nylon layers substantially raised the ballistic limit of the TMG (80% better, minimum).  This 
lay-up was labeled “medium”.  An additional lay-up that simply added another absorber layer 
(neoprene coated nylon) also showed some improvement in ballistic limit (53% better, minimum 
vs. the baseline TMG).  This lay-up was labeled “thin 2”; it could be useful for high flex areas of 
the TMG where minimal joint torque is desirable.  The ballistic limits for these lay-ups were 
utilized in the “enhanced suit” PNP calculations run in the BUMPER II computer model.   Each 
lay-up would be used selectively in an enhanced TMG.  See Figure 12 for a schematic of these 
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lay-ups for comparison to the baseline TMG in Figure 7.  Also view Figure 11 for the locations 
that the layups were modeled for on the EMU. 
 
igure 12 – Down Selected Lay-ups:  Thin 2 (Adds 1 Absorber Layer) and Medium (Adds 1 
Absorber Layer and 1 Open Cell Foam Layer) 
eg TMG Build and Test [12]
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L   
 was for ILC to integrate the “medium” lay-up concept into a viable 
hese new TMG concepts proved to be heavier than the existing leg TMG (+46% average).  The 
The next step in the evaluation
TMG.  The lower leg TMG was chosen for testing and 13 different manufacturing concepts were 
investigated.  Three concepts were selected to become full-sized mock-ups.  Each of the three 
selected concepts had a different method of assembling the layers.  In one, the Open Cell Foam 
(OCF) was allowed to float freely between absorber and liner layers.  In another the OCF pieces 
were intermittently stitched (tacked) to the liner peripherally.  In the third lay-up, the OCF was 
bonded peripherally to the liner. 
 
T
manufacturing method of one of the concepts was most similar to the way existing TMGs are 
made, keeping the OCF as a separate layer in the lay-up.  This manufacturing concept was 
deemed “best”, though all three concepts built were slated for torque testing. 
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All three “medium” concepts were successfully integrated with a lower leg, and pressurized, knee 
joint torque testing was completed at ILC.  Two ranges of knee flexion and extension were 
analyzed at a constant, slow rate of angular velocity.   For the 55° test, peak torque for the test 
unit vs. the baseline leg increased by 18% and with a 75° degree test, peak torque went up by 
35%.  Still, this level is well below the Leg specification maximum torque requirement.  Further, all 
three concepts behaved in a tight performance window.  See sample data for the 55° test in 
Figure 13.  
 
Figure 13 – Leg TMG Concept Torque Test, vs. Class 1 Flight Hardware Baseline, 55° Bend Angle 
Summary and Conclusions 
A highly successful program was executed by NASA and the spacesuit contractor community to 
• reassess the modeling inputs that impact the Probability of No Penetration (PNP) of the 
current Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) 
• recalculate the PNP for baseline and modified outer protective garments 
• test new Thermal and Micrometeoroid Garment (TMG) candidates to improve ballistic 
limits  
 16
• manufacture and test a small number of down-selected TMG constructions to assess 
their performance and technology readiness 
The overall program yielded an improved PNP analysis code that incorporates the new space 
environment model and more accurately represents the EMU, it’s possible spacewalk locations 
on the International Space Station (ISS) and the protective shadowing provided by the ISS and 
Shuttle.  Refinements to the ballistic limit equations used in the analysis were also incorporated.  
This model iteration shows that the present EMU, with its current protective garment, meets the 
requirements for crewmember protection over the full 2,700 hours of projected International 
Space Station Extravehicular Activity (EVA).  The current reported PNP is 0.94, which exceeds 
the 0.91 requirement. 
Thus, from a pure requirements standpoint, there is no need to enhance the TMG for MMOD 
protection.  But, using an analytical mindset, the improvement from a shielded PNP of 97.1% 
(baseline) to 98.1% (enhanced) is substantial.  It would reduce the chance of a penetration of the 
pressure bladder from 1 in 35, to 1 in 52 over the 2,700 projected EVA hours if the revised TMGs 
could be deployed today.  Another way to think of this is that enhancing the TMG with the 
recommended configuration reduces the chances of an MMOD penetration by about 35%!  Thus, 
improving the hypervelocity impact resistance of the TMG would be a significant benefit to 
spacewalking astronauts. 
Further, should a TMG with improved Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris (MMOD) resistance be 
requested, an improved leg has been designed, built and tested via down-selection from many 
candidate lay-ups.  Incorporation of this “medium” concept TMG into select areas of the EMU 
would provide substantive gains in the PNP and improved safety for EVA astronauts.  
Incorporation of the improved TMG would be at low technical risk due to the knowledge gained 
through this assessment.  As an example, a 1% overall PNP improvement could be realized by 
selectively incorporating the “thin 2” and the “medium” lay-ups in the EMU Thermal and 
Micrometeoroid Garment.  This technology improvement could apply to the EMU, or to any future 
EVA suit that must operate in a micrometeoroid and orbital debris environment. 
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Recommendations 
Current NASA planning will have the space environments model, ORDEM 2000, updated in the 
2007 time frame and that a separate Meteoroid Environment Model will also be issued in 2008.  
The authors have recommended that any hazard increases due to the environmental 
reassessment be rapidly evaluated by the EVA community and that any changes to the risk be 
assessed at that time. 
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Acronym and Definition List 
 
BUMPER –  (now BUMPER II) a NASA computer code that calculates the PNP of an orbiting body in LEO 
CM - EVA Crew Member 
EMU – Extravehicular Mobility Unit 
ERCA - EMU Remote Camera Assembly (an EMU helmet mounted camera system) 
EVA - Extra-Vehicular Activity 
Hardgoods – Polycarbonate, fiberglass and metallic elements of the EMU, usually covered by TMG 
HITF - Hypervelocity Impact Test Facility 
HS (HS SLS) - Hamilton Sundstrand, Space, Land & Sea Systems (Windsor Locks, CT) 
I-deas®  – a commercially available, solid modeling software 
ILC - ILC, Incorporated (Dover DE, or Houston, TX) 
ISS – International Space Station 
JSC - NASA Johnson Space Center (Houston, TX)  
TMG - Thermal and Micrometeoroid Garment of the EMU, the outer garment that forms the primary MMOD 
protection for the spacesuit 
LDEF – Long Duration Exposure Facility, a NASA satellite deployed and retrieved years later by the Shuttle 
with the express mission of evaluating materials durability in a space environment 
LEO – Low Earth Orbit 
LSS – Life Support System of the EMU, the backpack (hardgoods) 
MEM – Micrometeoroid Environments Model, next generation NASA model for micrometeoroids 
MOD – Mission Operations Directorate, the NASA group with the primary responsibility to train astronauts  
MLI – Multi-Layer Insulation, a stack-up of aluminized Mylar and non-woven scrim; very effective in space 
MMOD – Micrometeoroids and Orbital Debris 
MWS - EMU Mini-Work Station (a tool caddy for astronauts) 
NASA – The National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NBL – Neutral Buoyancy Laboratory, in Houston, TX, an underwater spacewalk simulation lab 
NCN – Neoprene Coated Nylon, the absorber layer in the EMU’s protective garment 
OCF - Open Cell Foam 
ORDEM xxxx  - Orbital Debris Environments Model, a NASA MMOD environments model of a given vintage 
(xxxx), this model is an input to BUMPER 
PNP - Probability of No Penetration (of the EMU, 1 = 100% safety from MMOD) 
Softgoods – Soft , fabric based elements of the EMU, includes the TMG, these locations are most vulnerable 
to MMOD strikes 
SSA – Space Suit Assembly, the non-life support system elements of the EMU (primarily softgoods) 
SSN – Space Surveillance Network, a network of radar resources used to track and catalog space debris 
STS-xxx – Space Transportation System (the Shuttle) and flight number (xxx), for example, STS-116 
+XVV – Positive X axis of the ISS flown in the direction of travel (Velocity Vector) 
-XVV – Negative X axis of the ISS flown in the direction of travel (Velocity Vector) 
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